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Re: [TLS] TLS client puzzles

Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org> Thu, 07 July 2016 21:46 UTC

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From: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
Date: Thu, 07 Jul 2016 17:36:58 -0400
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To: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com>
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Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Dmitry Khovratovich <khovratovich@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS client puzzles
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> I agree, and I think it is clear that client puzzles can be a useful
> addition to the DDoS defense toolbox.  However, most of this can be handled
> at the higher levels above TLS, or possibly as a custom extension that does
> not complicate TLS.
>

A custom extension is a promising approach: this is what Erik Nygren
proposed in nygren-tls-client-puzzles-00 following discussions with some
IETF folks and Akamai colleagues. That draft has expired and doesn't
reference any of the recent work on memory-hard puzzles, but it might be a
good starting point.

Except at the pre-TLS stage for applications that use STARTTLS-style
mechanisms, I'm not sure how this could work at levels above TLS: the
primary attack targeted by client puzzles would be a client doing almost no
work in order to force the server to do expensive crypto, which means it
must be engaged prior to the handshake.

Kyle

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