Re: [TLS] Lessons learned from TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 deprecation

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Hiya,

On 27/09/2019 01:02, Martin Thomson wrote:
> So I agree with Kathleen's conclusion: 

Me too, FWIW.

> not to change the goals of the
> current document.  But there are changes that I think are necessary
> (and thanks to Daniel and John for highlighting these).
> 
> BTW, I've moved this to the TLS working group, because this is an
> active topic there and I don't see anything in my email that SAAG
> needs to concern itself with.
> 
> On Fri, Sep 27, 2019, at 01:00, Daniel Migault wrote:
>> My understanding of deprecating of TLS1.0 TLS 1.1 is that: a) new
>> software do not use these versions b) existing software stop
>> supporting these versions.
> 
> That differs from my perspective.
> 
> When we release a new version of something, we are sending a
> message:
> 
> 1. new implementations and deployments MUST include support for newer
> versions 2. existing implementations and deployments SHOULD be
> updated to support newer versions
> 
> When we deprecate an old version of something, we are sending a
> message:
> 
> 3. only use this old version if you absolutely have to 4. you are
> encouraged to take active measures to remove the need to use the old
> version 5. you have our support if you decide not to support this old
> version
> 
> Now, "support" from the IETF is about as meaningful as you think it
> is.  And you can s/MUST/really ought to/ and s/SHOULD/may wish to/
> [RFC6919].
> 
> In browser-land, we've decided to form a coalition when it comes to
> removing TLS 1.0/1.1.  3GPP have obviously got their own support
> group, which seems to be functioning effectively, which is great.
> 
>> """The expectation is that TLSv1.2 will continue to be used for
>> many years alongside TLSv1.3."""

So is your proposed change to only remove that sentence?

Personally, I'm not that fussed. Including or omitting that
seems not a big deal to me. If the WG are however keen on
such a change that's fine too. OTOH, we've already done a
bunch of process-steps with this process-draft so I do
wonder if that change really amounts to a worthwhile thing.

Cheers,
S.

> 
> Some people have that expectation, but I think that John is right to
> challenge it.  There remain reasons that people are sticking with 1.2
> for now, but those reasons are mostly to do with allowing time to
> flush out the vestiges of a dependency on some of the TLS 1.2
> idiosyncrasies.
> 
> I would advocate for removing this statement and any residue of that
> sentiment from the draft.  It's speculation and, even if it were
> true, it conveys the wrong message.  The only message I would include
> is that one that is further down the document: "Any newer version of
> TLS is more secure than TLSv1.1."
> 
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