Re: [TLS] Application layer interactions and API guidance

On Sat, Oct 8, 2016 at 7:25 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Oct 7, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Oct 7, 2016 at 3:00 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <
> ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> On Fri, Oct 07, 2016 at 01:41:14PM -0700, Watson Ladd wrote:
> >> > On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:47 PM, Ilari Liusvaara
> >> > <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> >> > >
> >> > > Also, it is very likely that 0-RTT would need its own read API,
> >> > > because
> >> > > it is pretty unlikely that existing API could be safely retrofitted
> >> > > or even purpose-built unified API be designed that isn't just asking
> >> > > for security problems via mixing 0-RTT and 1-RTT data.
> >> >
> >> > Yes. In particular I think the TLS state machine transitions need to
> >> > be ordered with respect to the arrival and sending of data. The
> >> > challenge for a multithreaded program (yes, some programs have
> >> > multiple threads sending and receiving at once) is making this make
> >> > sense, or even a single-threaded program where the TLS stack can
> >> > change state at times not visible to the sending thread. Maybe there
> >> > is some slop here, like 0-RTT can become 1-RTT on send, but this
> >> > raises all sorts of problems for receiving. I think we need to require
> >> > separation in the API.
> >>
> >> 0-RTT can't be allowed to become 1-RTT on send (unless it is auto-
> >> retransmit, which needs to be disableable, as sometimes that just plain
> >> won't work).
> >
> >
> > Can you explain why that is?
>
> Grammar problems.
>
> Let's say you have an context-free parseable protocol, and you want to
> insert the restriction that there is a 0-RTT set of allowed constructions
> and an 1-RTT allowed set that is bigger. The most obvious way to do this is
> to treat the transition as a token that comes between the top-level
> productions of each set of allowable things: so I send you a bunch of 0-RTT
> allowed bits, then switch, then a bunch of 1-RTT allowed bits.
>
> If the sending stack can insert that transition anywhere the grammar
> explodes.
>
In the APIs people have been designing, 0-RTT can become 1-RTT but not the
other way around.
Specifically:

- There is an option to allow 0-RTT writing
- With that option on, SSL_Write() succeeds in both 0-RTT and 1-RTT modes.
- There is a callback that tells you when you have gone from 0-RTT to 1-RTT.

-Ekr

One could try to handle this by some nasty "did we switch before now"
> construction to delay the transition. But you still need to switch how you
> are reading.
>

-Ekr

> >
> > -Ekr
> >
> >
> >
> >> This impiles that the application always needs to explicitly signal
> >> the end of 0-RTT data, even just to abort sending it.
> >>
> >> > > (This is the reason one needs to be especially careful when
> combining
> >> > > dynamic client certificates with HTTP/2... Basically, it can not be
> >> > > done safely without coordination on application layer).
> >> > >
> >> > > One likely wants application protocol to be able to specify part of
> >> > > or the entiere request context and to extract that part in the other
> >> > > end when requesting a certificate selection. This is to allow
> putting
> >> > > part of coordination data into the request itself. However, this is
> >> > > not
> >> > > sufficient for e.g. HTTP/2 signaling, so more needs to be exchanged
> at
> >> > > application layer.
> >> > >
> >> > > And then upon completion of the authentication (either successful or
> >> > > explicitly rejected), signal the application with the new
> certificate
> >> > > chain and the context the request had.
> >> >
> >> > This is going to require major changes to APIs and to the HTTP/2
> >> > layer. It also interacts with token binding, whee! My question then
> >> > becomes one of what we actually need: can we assume that leakage
> >> > between authentication contexts over a single session is safe because
> >> > all contexts represent the same principal, by restricting the usages,
> >> > or is this overly restrictive?
> >>
> >> Yes, it is going to reuqire such changes.
> >>
> >> And you absolutely can not assume that all contexts present the same
> >> principal.
> >>
> >> And as I said, in multiplexed protocol like HTTP/2, you need
> application-
> >> level coordination on top. TLS just can't do that.
> >>
> >> > When we have multiple requests and replies in flight and the
> >> > authentication state changes, things get nasty. If we think of TLS as
> >> > sending a stream of events including authentication changes to the
> >> > application, this fits the semantics of the TLS draft as I understand
> >> > them to be, but does not necessarily fit what application protocols
> >> > want. There might be a semantic mismatch here requiring reworking of
> >> > one or another part.
> >>
> >> Also, some applications presumably want the events done synchronously,
> >> so they don't move with data reads.
> >>
> >>
> >> Basically, post-handshake auth is heckuva nasty problem.
> >>
> >>
> >> -Ilari
> >>
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> >
> >
>
> --
> "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
> --Rousseau.
>