Re: [TLS] TLS 1.2

In message <E1E9gEQ-0002RK-00@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Peter Gutmann writes
:
>Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> writes:
>
>>I'd like to start a discussion on whether we should be thinking about a TLS
>>1.2 that was more oriented towards newer hash functions. Obviously, we're not
>>at a point where there's a crisis yet but it doesn't hurt to be prepared.
>
>I've actually had a proposal for fixing TLS' broken signatures sketched out
>probably since it was still SSL, so perhaps we can use this to fix several
>problems at once.  Firstly, in terms of attacks on hash functions, the only
>thing that really needs to be addressed is the use of hash functions as, well,
>hash functions.  Most of the use in TLS is as PRFs and in HMAC, none of which
>are even remotely endangered by any known attack.  Signatures, however, need
>to be fixed for three main reasons:

Note that we're also talking about negotiating which certificates are 
used.

		--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@lists.ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls