Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests-01.txt

[Hubert Kario <[e-mail]>]

On Friday, 7 June 2019 01:47:25 CEST [e-mail] wrote:
> There are also htmlized versions available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequests-01

>    clients without server-side, per-client state.  Servers vend an

>    number of tickets vended per connection.  Second, clients do not have

>    NewSessionTicket messages to vend.  This extension is only applicable

>       such services to vend tickets to clients to use for accelerated

>    A supporting server MAY vend TicketRequestContents.count

>    tickets they are willing to vend to clients.  Thus, the number of

typos: send, sended


I think that the use cases should list a situation in which the client does 
not expect to perform session resume, so it can inform the server of that by 
sending the value 0.

The draft does not state what is the expected behaviour with tickets in 
relation to post-handshake authentication.

The draft does not state if the extension is negotiated once per session or 
its values should be reused for resumed sessions.

The draft does not state how the extension interacts with Hello Retry Request 
handshake. Can it be dropped/added/changed in 2nd CH message? What is expected 
to happen when client does change it?

>    Servers that support ticket requests MUST NOT echo "ticket_request"
>    in the EncryptedExtensions.

It's not spelled out what the client is expected to do when server does 
violate this expectation. I'd say it should abort with unsupported_extension.
-- 
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic