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Re: [TLS] Final nail in the coffin for cleartext SNI/ALPN in TLS 1.3

Ralf Skyper Kaiser <skyper@thc.org> Thu, 07 November 2013 19:36 UTC

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Date: Thu, 07 Nov 2013 19:36:17 +0000
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From: Ralf Skyper Kaiser <skyper@thc.org>
To: mrex@sap.com, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Final nail in the coffin for cleartext SNI/ALPN in TLS 1.3
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Hi Martin,

(see also my full email further below where I mention DNS and why the
shortfall of current DNS should not stop us from fixing TLS - because
otherwise the DNS guys say there is no need to fix DNS because SNI in TLS
is cleartext as well...we have to start somewhere.......Please also see
comment on how just having DNS leaking this information raises the cost for
surveillance and in some cases makes it impractical if not impossible -
that's the goal.)

regards,

ralf



On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 6:59 PM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

> Ralf Skyper Kaiser wrote:
> >
> > Some thoughts why SNI (host name) should be
> > transmitted encrypted and not in clear.
>
> But you are aware that there is no such thing as a
> "confidential DNS lookup" (confidential towards whom anyways),
> so that in general, what your browser is connecting will be
> directly preceded by a cleartext DNS lookup with that very name...
>
> (Not revealing the "next protocol" or client certs/identities
>  is a different issue.)
>
> -Martin
>

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