Re: [TLS] interop for TLS clients proposing TLSv1.1

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Wed, 21 September 2011 22:28 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: yngve@opera.com (Yngve N. Pettersen)
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2011 00:30:48 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <op.v16gryhlqrq7tp@acorna.oslo.osa> from "Yngve N. Pettersen" at Sep 21, 11 11:32:12 pm
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Subject: Re: [TLS] interop for TLS clients proposing TLSv1.1
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Yngve N. Pettersen wrote:
> 
> On Wed, 21 Sep 2011 22:48:33 +0200, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> 
> > Does anyone (SSL Labs, Opera, others) have any figures/stats about the
> > current "TLSv1.1 version (in)tolerance" for TLS servers on the public
> > internet?
> 
> This week's test of 609726 servers gave these numbers:
> 
>    * 1.145% of the probed servers were version intolerant for at least one  
>      of the current TLS versions (1.0, 1.1, 1.2)
>    * 1.742% were extension intolerant for the same versions
>    * 1.136% belonged in both groups
> 
> This gives an estimated total of 1.751% that are either version and/or  
> extension intolerant for the currently defined TLS versions.

OK, I'll try to be more specific about the numbers that
*I* would be interest in (in case you could extract from your data):

When sending an SSLv3 ClientHello (i.e. {0x03,0x00} at the record layer),
how many servers abort immediately, depending on the value of the
client_version:

    for client_version = { 0x03,0x00 }   (SSLv3)
    for client_version = { 0x03,0x01 }   (TLSv1.0)
    for client_version = { 0x03,0x02 }   (TLSv1.1)
    for client_version = { 0x03,0x03 }   (TLSv1.2)

and how many continue the handshake but fail the finished macs?


-Martin