Re: [TLS] Rethink TLS 1.3

[Watson Ladd <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Nov 25, 2014 at 6:46 AM, Hubert Kario <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Monday 24 November 2014 09:35:20 Watson Ladd wrote:
>> On Mon, Nov 24, 2014 at 8:56 AM, Martin Rex <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> > Nico Williams wrote:
>> >> Henrick Hellström wrote:
>> >>> Yes, but the point I am trying to make, is that if the implied goal
>> >>> is to make TLS resilient even against BEAST/CRIME style attacks, the
>> >>> threat model should be defined accordingly. It makes little sense to
>> >>> ask for cryptographic review of the protocol, if it is inherently
>> >>> unclear exactly what kind of threats the protocol is designed to
>> >>> withstand.
>> >>
>> >> BEAST/CRIME are dramatic demonstrations of the capabilities of attackers
>> >> in the Internet threat model.
>> >
>> > Nope.  BEAST, CRIME and Poodle are pretty boring demonstrations of the
>> > ridiculous insecurity of WebBrowsers in their default
> configuration.https://tcms.engineering.redhat.com/case/295339/
>>
>> So it's possible to get my Paypal login cookie if I browse to a
>> malicious site on a fully patched browser? Because that's what BEAST
>> enabled. Are you saying it's fine that SSL v3.0 leaks one byte per
>> connection? Because that's POODLE. All of this was known in 2004, and
>> not fixed in TLS 1.2
>
> are you suggesting that AEAD ciphers are vulnerable to them? based on what
> mechanism?
>
> I mean, sure they are not mandatory or the only TLS 1.2 compatible ciphers,
> but there are there...

Fixed means fixed, not "you get to play choose your own ciphersuite,
where most of the options are wrong". It means aggressively removing
ciphers and protocols known to be weak. Instead of considering the job
done when secure options have been added, we should consider it done
when the insecure options have been removed.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario



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