[TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5246 (5409)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Tue, 26 June 2018 12:29 UTC

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Subject: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5246 (5409)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5246,
"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2".

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You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5409

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Type: Technical
Reported by: Eugene Adell <eugene.adell@gmail.com>;

Section: Appendix A.5

Original Text
-------------
   Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are
   reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in
   SSL 3.

Corrected Text
--------------
   Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are
   reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in
   SSL 3. The cipher suite value { 0x00, 0x1E } firstly also assigned to
   Fortezza has been released and has since been be reassigned. 

Notes
-----
RFC 2712 (Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security) in its Draft 01 version introduces three new cipher suites colliding with the three Fortezza ones. The Draft 02 version partially corrects that, by moving the Kerberos cipher suites values by two.
This omission of the third cipher suite has never been corrected, and this remains in the same state in the final RFC 2712, RFC 2246 and its successors including this one.

Changing the first Kerberos cipher suite value, or moving all of them, would now not make any sense. Enhancing the note as suggested is probably enough to mention how one Fortezza cipher suite disappeared.

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RFC5246 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10)
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Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
Publication Date    : August 2008
Author(s)           : T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Transport Layer Security
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG