Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates
Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Mon, 27 August 2018 16:38 UTC
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Aug 2018 08:37:50 -0800
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To: Mounira Msahli <mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr>
Cc: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates
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On Mon, Aug 27, 2018, 8:21 AM Mounira Msahli < mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr> wrote: > Hi Hubert, > > I can do the exercise but the result will be two sections totally > decorrelated: one for TLS 1.3 and one for TLS 1.2. Two drafts in one > document. > > - The handshake phase in TLS 1.2 is different from handshake/TLS1.3 > - The certificate type is different. One uses cert_type and the other uses > extension defined in [RFC7250]. > Why does the first point matter? And the certificates are embedded pretty opaquely in TLS. > > Kind Regards > Mounira > > > > ----- Mail original ----- > De: "Hubert Kario" <hkario@redhat.com> > À: "tls" <tls@ietf.org> > Cc: "Mounira Msahli" <mounira.msahli@telecom-paristech.fr>, "Ilari > Liusvaara" <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> > Envoyé: Lundi 27 Août 2018 16:39:56 > Objet: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE > 1609.2 certificates > > On Friday, 24 August 2018 19:44:36 CEST Mounira Msahli wrote: > > - You should also specify use in TLS 1.2 in the same draft (or say that > > is prohibited). This is so one only needs one reference for the > > codepoint allocation. > > > > >>> It is not prohibited, for TLS 1.2 the extension is already > specified: [ > > >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-01 ] > > [ https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-01 | > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-serhrouchni-tls-certieee1609-01 ] We > will > > update the draft > > wouldn't then it be better to combine them and have one standard > (document) > that describes use in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3? I may be missing something but > I > don't see anything that would prevent use of the same codepoints in both > protocol versions > > -- > Regards, > Hubert Kario > Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team > Web: www.cz.redhat.com > Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00 Brno, Czech Republic > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
- [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 103 09… Mounira Msahli
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… William Whyte
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Mounira Msahli
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Mounira Msahli
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Wang Haiguang
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Mounira Msahli
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Wang Haiguang
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… William Whyte
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Mounira Msahli
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Mounira Msahli
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Mounira Msahli
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Mounira Msahli
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Mounira Msahli
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… William Whyte
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 Authentication using ETSI TS 10… Mounira Msahli
- [TLS] Updating the draft: TLS Authentication usin… Mounira Msahli
- [TLS] Updating the draft: TLS Authentication usin… Mounira Msahli