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Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices

Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk> Mon, 24 March 2014 11:33 UTC

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From: Feng Hao <feng.hao@newcastle.ac.uk>
To: "'Paterson, Kenny'" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices
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Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2014 11:33:04 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices
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Hi Kenny,

Thanks for your advice and expert comments.

>That's a shame. I'd have hoped you'd have learned how to use PAKE models
>and formal security proofs in the intervening period.

I've learned that the formal model analysis (or "provable security") is trickier than what I hoped to see. Maybe only time can tell if adding layers of formalism to the security proofs is really the right way to go. 

>Indeed. But that should not stop you (or anyone else, but it's really on you)
>from choosing one of the existing models and giving a proof for your protocol.

Yes, I'm not giving up on it : )

Best regards,
Feng

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