Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - some issues related to PKCS11

[[e-mail] (Martin Rex)]

Michael StJohns wrote:
> On 9/17/2013 8:49 AM, Martin Rex wrote:
> > I fail to understand what you're trying to protect.
> >
> > The master secret of a session is never a secret that is hidding
> > within the hardware module, instead, it is something known to the
> > calling TLS protocol stack and part of the TLS session cache.
> 
> Um.  No, not if you designed things properly.  It should be possible for 
> any protocol the IETF designs to do all the crypto operation inside a 
> hardware module and not depend on the weak security of a general purpose 
> computer.
> 
> I want to protect inside of the HSM all of the following:
> 
> a) the private keys related to the server or client identity
> b) the pre-master key
> c) the master key
> d) the session keys.
> 
> I want to be able to do all the cryptographic processing inside that 
> module and only allow out true plain text.
> 
> > For vanilla RSA cipher suites, it is deterministically derived
> > from randomness generated by the client and conveyed under
> > RSA encryption, deterministically combined with data known
> > in plain to the TLS protocol stack.
> 
> I think you're talking about the pre-master secret?  If so, yes, but 
> so?  The encrypted pre-master secret goes to the HSM where it's 
> decrypted, run through a KDF and used to produce the master secret. 
> Ideally, that master secret may be retained within the HSM and protected 
> from disclosure.

Typically, the PKCS#11 module will export an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
primitive, and the server will typically be able to pass the encrypted
premaster-secret, reference his strongly protected server credentials
and obtain the RSA-decrypted output.  Once that decrypted pre-master
secret is obtained, everything else is deterministic.

-Martin