[TLS]Re: Trust Anchor Negotiation Surveillance Concerns and Risks

Nick Harper <ietf@nharper.org> Sat, 20 July 2024 02:11 UTC

Return-Path: <nharper@nharper.org>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A0BFEC151980 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 19 Jul 2024 19:11:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.899
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_KAM_HTML_FONT_INVALID=0.01, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XoKI8Oo99W2c for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 19 Jul 2024 19:11:24 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-lf1-f41.google.com (mail-lf1-f41.google.com [209.85.167.41]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0F602C15155F for <tls@ietf.org>; Fri, 19 Jul 2024 19:11:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-lf1-f41.google.com with SMTP id 2adb3069b0e04-52ea929ea56so4068285e87.0 for <tls@ietf.org>; Fri, 19 Jul 2024 19:11:23 -0700 (PDT)
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1721441482; x=1722046282; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=gRghUX1wkjlmMkxolT5Kn0S/qPcx+jmm4fxQtjQvjG0=; b=g/WAID/smYd5Oloztx6utd6YGxVFHF1dP9by1Inhg7rqn8+hiuvzlHsJujLZxoi42X XyyKFG/auBhOJJoyeqhgHOY9ilW8Cnp9HlpYiZkqImtjvE612wVMB/ykZkeoLe/9q5b5 BipNDr4I91cl7ywsO+JTqMVU/FDAVx/NysU3loKRk8KyRbuxAqAufOfvXR1za4lJXpjP NEbeZv3mZYSv0Ev1VVoy55A+s7xJlJjW0jJjImMT4g4kw/Wn6ko83ShL6aYMS/OP2zqG gT8ZzL63srnNJ/N3irlBs0nARhW0IKI0FiBVSc0L3BDXHW3jaJY/9H7eItrgnnh6udKB QeWQ==
X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCXxYmNWizAl4sHB/iCfmYZi4KxT/dr4ZV9IedysmsCNKb4VdGzZh9QoGjju9IccYAcBG31Q6vngczTWArQ=
X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yy3weXNR0Igq5h8Sr8qGFq9750908Q5e50LXXJ0SLesziBzf+8U /yiIs7dLNJvfrdPePwhchoQEiFXqYcI5lHKiwYiJcX67jn/0QB8bi3akW+YJD/xP+y82URqjkVF ejL67HaWH66uiKeObK0fP6PmN02smUdA8XeHDGQ==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IHvPJELWZEpFVFccum0D51wexVbk5Paii4uD2XG0GMf1C2gXNbuy4kf9RsVhYW2dJ28fT0Mwu8RSrwGuh041dQ=
X-Received: by 2002:a05:6512:3053:b0:52e:9cc7:4462 with SMTP id 2adb3069b0e04-52efb5223b8mr128566e87.11.1721441481562; Fri, 19 Jul 2024 19:11:21 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CAD2nvsT4qWqudiv1C1wZn6rB4_s-9EDENq5TXEbxr_ygcMFjDQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAChr6Sw+gxK3dO29F9bsLTQReJz6LzT2hZb5O7LAXmKzQbKTSw@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAChr6Sw+gxK3dO29F9bsLTQReJz6LzT2hZb5O7LAXmKzQbKTSw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Nick Harper <ietf@nharper.org>
Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2024 19:11:10 -0700
Message-ID: <CACcvr=mgpn_NMagoKS8X9U2xQU+hLGYAfWeyVDA_iQmYXp05Xg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000002b8cb061da454da"
Message-ID-Hash: 4AYUASRJT7LI44PAWJYOTD2XZTUHUFRQ
X-Message-ID-Hash: 4AYUASRJT7LI44PAWJYOTD2XZTUHUFRQ
X-MailFrom: nharper@nharper.org
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-tls.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: Devon O'Brien <asymmetric=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>, tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc4
Precedence: list
Subject: [TLS]Re: Trust Anchor Negotiation Surveillance Concerns and Risks
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/XuO7ck6C_ljG5oOrXRKka8pNEGI>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:tls-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:tls-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:tls-leave@ietf.org>

The scenario where more than one party has the private keys is described in
scenario 6 [1]. The analysis of that scenario is that trust anchor
negotiation has no effect on the surveillant's ability to carry out their
goals.

1:
https://github.com/davidben/tls-trust-expressions/blob/main/surveillance-and-trust-anchor-negotiation.md#scenario-6-government-mandates-escrow-of-tls-private-keys-and-secrets

On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 7:06 PM Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> wrote:

> Isn’t the most obvious issue that more than one party have the private
> keys?
>
> thanks,
> Rob
>
> On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 18:29 Devon O'Brien <asymmetric=
> 40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi all, We’ve added a document that attempts to summarize, and offer an
>> initial analysis of, several of the scenarios that have been raised in
>> on-list discussions related to the possibilities that Trust Expressions (or
>> more broadly, Trust Anchor Negotiation) could be used to enable
>> surveillance, or to make surveillance easier to achieve than with existing
>> solutions.
>>
>> We’ve been adding to this document for some time, and while there is
>> overlap with the documents that Dennis has recently shared, it is not a
>> response to them, as it was nearly complete by the time they were posted.
>> Our goal is for this analysis to be complete and accurate, so we will
>> incorporate additional scenarios, arguments, and analysis over time based
>> on the ensuing discussion.
>>
>>
>> https://github.com/davidben/tls-trust-expressions/blob/main/surveillance-and-trust-anchor-negotiation.md
>>
>> As with any of the other documents in the repository, we encourage you to
>> ask on list, or file a github issue if you feel we have missed something or
>> that our analysis is incorrect
>>
>> We look forward to the WGs comments and hope to see those coming to
>> Vancouver next week.
>>
>> - Devon, Bob, David
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org
>> To unsubscribe send an email to tls-leave@ietf.org
>>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org
> To unsubscribe send an email to tls-leave@ietf.org
>