Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication in browsers

Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com> Thu, 28 July 2011 15:00 UTC

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Date: Thu, 28 Jul 2011 17:00:22 +0200
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Cc: stefan.winter@restena.lu, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] HTTPS client-certificate-authentication in browsers
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On 2011-07-28 16:45, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu>; writes:
> 
>> Banking: These days, TAN lists are going away.
> 
> Is there any information on what's being done in countries like France, Italy,
> the Netherlands, Spain, ...?  The only place where it's really documented (in
> quite some detail) is Germany (with surrounding/similar countries like Austria
> and Switzerland using equivalent approaches), but what are other countries in
> Europe doing?  There's rather little information *from third parties, not the
> vendors* publicly available on how e-banking is done in France, Spain, ...,
> the pros and cons, how it deals with new attack types, and so on.
> 
>> a) cell phone transaction numbers:
> 
> The problem is that mTANs are vulnerable to smartphone malware, as Zeus has
> already shown.  It's currently a minor threat, but who knows how far the bad
> guys will take it.  On the whole though mTANs are a nice tradeoff, you get to
> verify the transaction over an independent channel, and the mTAN is a
> cryptographic hash over the transaction data so if a MITB tries to modify what
> the browser sends it gets detected.

It may be nice from a security point of view but it is horribly inconvenient.
I don't believe for a second that "this is where we are going".

Apple's interest in becoming the PayPal for the physical world will
take mobile security to levels PCs never did.

In iPhone client-side PKI is already ease to enroll even for Joe Sixpack!

Anders

> 
> Peter.
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