[TLS]Re: Adoption Call for draft-davidben-tls-key-share-prediction

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 21 May 2024 18:23 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 21 May 2024 11:22:46 -0700
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: [TLS]Re: Adoption Call for draft-davidben-tls-key-share-prediction
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These are all fair points, and it's possible we don't need to do anything
with the transcript.

I don't think we need to resolve this before adoption, I just wanted to
make sure that I said something now to make sure people weren't surprised
later.

-Ekr


On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 6:46 AM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:

> Off the cuff, folding it into the transcript sounds tricky, since existing
> TLS servers won't know to do it, and, as with any other DNS hints, we need
> to accommodate the DNS being out of sync with the server. It'll also be
> more difficult to deploy due to needing changes in the TLS stack and
> generally require much, much tighter coordination between DNS and TLS. I'd
> like for that coordination to be more viable (see my comments on the
> .well-known draft), but I don't think we're there yet.
>
> But I'm certainly open to continue discussing it and this problem space!
> The original version of the draft actually tried a lot harder to handle the
> downgrade story. Rather than mess with the transcript, it defined away all
> the negotiation algorithms where this would be a problem and keyed the
> NamedGroup codepoints to know when you could be guaranteed of the narrower
> server behavior.
>
> My read of the feedback was that people thought this was an unnecessary
> complication and that servers doing a key-share-first selection were doing
> so intentionally because they believed the options roughly equivalent. So I
> took all that out and replaced it with text to that effect.
>
> David
>
>
> On Tue, May 21, 2024, 08:54 Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>> I agree that it's attractive to be able to hint in the HTTPS RR, but I'm
>> less sure about addressing the basic insecurity of the DNS channel with the
>> approach this draft takes. I don't have a complete thought here, but what
>> if we were to somehow fold the hint into the handshake transcript? I
>> suppose we can sort this out post-adoption, but I'd like the question to be
>> on the table.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>> On Fri, May 3, 2024 at 3:05 PM Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> wrote:
>>
>>> This is a working group call for adoption
>>> for draft-davidben-tls-key-share-prediction.  This document was presented
>>> at IET 118 and has undergone some revision based on feedback since then.
>>> The current draft is available here:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-davidben-tls-key-share-prediction/.
>>> Please read the document and indicate if and why you support or do not
>>> support adoption as a TLS working group item. If you support adoption
>>> please, state if you will help review and contribute text to the document.
>>> Please respond to this call by May 20, 2024.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Joe, Deidre, and Sean
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
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>