Re: [TLS] TLSrenego - possibilities, suggestion for SSLv3

[Yair Elharrar <[e-mail]>]

Martin Rex wrote:

> So the smallest possible change to a server that could be used
> to signal to ANY client that it believes to be doing an initial
> handshake might be to set the most significant octet of the
> gmt_unix_time to zero in order for a server to signal in an
> extremely backward compatible fashion to the client that it
> is performing an initial TLS handshake on a connection.

It would probably be better if the entire 32-bit gmt_unix_time was set to one of two predefined magic values: one indicating an initial connection ('INIT'), the other indicating a renegotiation ('RNEG').
A client receiving 'RNEG' on an initial handshake would know the session is under attack.
A client receiving 'INIT' on an initial handshake would know the session is safe.
Any other value would indicate the server is running an insecure implementation.


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