Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2

Mateusz Jończyk <mat.jonczyk@o2.pl> Wed, 03 January 2018 16:54 UTC

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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2
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W dniu 03.01.2018 o 17:08, Russ Housley pisze:
> Mateusz:
> 
> How do you see IANA controlling which parties get certificates for the access_administratively_disabled.net domain?

IANA is just an example, there could be some other provider controlling the
access_administratively_disabled.net domain - possibly even OpenDNS.
Subdomains [1] would be given out just like EV certificates are today - only
proof of identity (and of payment) would be required.

> 
> Russ
> 
> P.S.  If I recall RFC 1034 and 1035 correctly, domain name labels may contain only letters, digits, and hyphen.  Underscore is not allowed.

Yup, I also thought so.
access_administratively_disabled.net is only a placeholder, the final domain
name would be different.

Greetings,
Mateusz

[1] For a slight modification of the proposal, see
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25226.html

> 
>> On Jan 3, 2018, at 7:48 AM, Mateusz Jończyk <mat.jonczyk@o2.pl> wrote:
>>
>> Hello,
>> Based on Your feedback (for which I am grateful) I have designed a new version
>> of the access_administratively_disabled mechanism.
>>
>> 1. One new AlertDescription value should be specified:
>> access_administratively_disabled.
>>
>> 2. The information why the webpage is blocked is specified at the URL
>> https://access_administratively_disabled.net?d=${domain_name} as a simple string.
>>
>> 3. Certificates for access_administratively_disabled.net are assigned in a
>> non-usual way: any big entity that blocks websites (e.g. OpenDNS) may get a
>> certificate for access_administratively_disabled.net provided that their
>> identity is validated (i.e. in an Extended-Validation way). The list of entities
>> that received certificates for this domain would be made public and managed by
>> IANA. This way the risk of phishing would be eliminated.
>>
>> 4. Any entity that is blocking some websites would redirect traffic for
>> access_administratively_disabled.net to their own servers.
>> 					
>> 5. After getting an access_administratively_disabled warning a browser would
>> open https://access_admininistratively_disabled.net?d=${domain_name} , validate
>> its certificate and display to the user information: what get blocked, by whom
>> and why.
>>
>> 6. If https://access_administratively_disabled.net would not have a valid
>> certificate, the browser would only display that the website is being blocked,
>> without giving any reason.
>>
>> 7. IANA or someone else would provide a default
>> https://access_administratively_disabled.net service for the public internet.
>>
>> This mechanism would provide blocking transparency without affecting security.
>>
>> Greetings,
>> Mateusz Jończyk
>>
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> 
>