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Re: [TLS] PRs for this morning

Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@polarssl.org> Thu, 13 November 2014 20:22 UTC

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Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2014 21:20:59 +0100
From: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@polarssl.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PRs for this morning
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On 13/11/2014 21:00, Martin Rex wrote:
> Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>
>> Merging session resumption and tickets and moving ticket
>> establishment to a update:
>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/96
> 
> 
> In case that you intend to add rfc5077 TLS session ticket support
> to TLSv1.3, is that using the same bogus CBC-Encryption
> (i.e. mac+pad+encrypt instead of pad+mac+encrypt) that Vaudenay
> described as a security issue, that was never fixed in TLS up to v1.2
> and provided the grounds for LuckyThirteen and Poodle?
> 
I'm not sure what you're talking about. To me, RFC 5077 section 4 looks like it
recommends pad+encrypt+mac (aka EEM) which is secure.

   The actual state information in encrypted_state is encrypted using
   128-bit AES in CBC mode with the given IV.  The Message
   Authentication Code (MAC) is calculated using HMAC-SHA-256 over
   key_name (16 octets) and IV (16 octets), followed by the length of
   the encrypted_state field (2 octets) and its contents (variable
   length).

Manuel.

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