Re: [TLS] Include Speck block cipher?

Joachim Strömbergson <joachim@secworks.se> Tue, 07 October 2014 05:26 UTC

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Date: Tue, 07 Oct 2014 07:25:59 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Include Speck block cipher?
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Aloha!

Hanno Böck wrote:
> Am Sun, 5 Oct 2014 16:18:50 -0700 schrieb Ryan Carboni
> <ryacko@gmail.com>;:
> 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speck_%28cipher%29
> 
> Quote: "Speck is a family of lightweight block ciphers publicly
> released by the NSA in June 2013."

Even more importanyly - SPECK and SIMON (another new lightweight cipher
designed by NSA) has been found to be weak against differential
crypyanalysis:

http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/568.pdf

https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/543.pdf

Considering that NSA was able to design DES in the 1970ies to be
resistant to differential attacks, one almost have to wonder if a new
generation of NSA employess have forgotten what the previous generation
clearly knew about.

So, no: SPECK and SIMON should not be included in TLS. Not because of
the provenance, but because they are known to be weak/broken today.

- -- 
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours

Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning.
========================================================================
 Joachim Strömbergson          Secworks AB          joachim@secworks.se
========================================================================
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