Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
Fabrice Gautier <fabrice.gautier@gmail.com> Fri, 25 July 2014 21:06 UTC
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From: Fabrice Gautier <fabrice.gautier@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 14:05:58 -0700
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
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I also object this proposal I'm not too familiar with IETF process, but shouldn't we have test results first before we actually update the draft ? I know its just a draft and it can be probably be changed back if the test results are bad, but it seems it might be an uphill battle then. Also I haven't seen a discussion of what the tests would be, or what would be considered acceptable results. I didn't think the IETF process usually involve testing in any formal manner. I'm assuming that this would be up to individual contributors to test this with their own TLS 1.3 draft implementations and then raise issues if they appear later ? If thats correct, it seems that this proposal is to update the draft and see if anybody complains later based on actual tests. On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 1:57 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi. > > I believe that changing the 5-byte record header will cause us trouble. Passive IDS/IPS devices follow TLS streams to detect certain attacks. They will cut connections. I also believe that it is impossible to “run some tests” because there are literally dozens of different such middleboxes, with multiple software/firmware versions available for each type. > > I therefore support leaving the 5-byte header as it is, fixing the ContentType value to 23 for all encrypted records, and having another contentType byte within the encrypted record. > > Yoav > > On Jul 25, 2014, at 1:37 PM, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) <jsalowey@cisco.com> wrote: > >> At the interim meeting on July 20, 2014 there was general consensus to support the encryption of TLS 1.3 content type. The favored approach was to remove the content type and version from the TLS record layer header and add the content type to the encrypted data. The proposal is to update the draft to document this approach and try to run some tests to see if this causes much grief with middle boxes. If you object to this proposal please respond to the list by Friday, August 01, 2014. >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Fabrice Gautier
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
- [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Juho Vähä-Herttua
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Brian Sniffen
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti