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Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on supporting only AEAD ciphers

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Tue, 29 April 2014 15:56 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on supporting only AEAD ciphers
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Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2014 15:55:54 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on supporting only AEAD ciphers
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Fedor Brunner <fedor.brunner@azet.sk> writes:

>The Mandatory Cipher Suite for TLS 1.2 was TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. What
>is the mandatory cipher in TLS 1.3 ? Maybe
>TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 using Curve25519 for ECDHE ?

Ugh, no.  That takes the ciphers from <industry-standard>+<industry-standard>
+<industry-standard> to <oddball-nonstandard>+<oddball-nonstandard>+<oddball-
nonstandard>+<industry-standard>.  Make the defaults something that can be
implemented with a standard crypto library, and leave the oddball stuff as
optional fashion statements.

(No disrespect intended for the algorithms I've designated as "oddball", but I
want something where the default is built from standard, accepted, widely-
recognised algorithms so I don't have to explain to every customer what
ChaCha20 is and why it's being used to protect their banking transactions).

Peter.

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