[TLS] Re: [EXT] Re: WG Adoption Call for ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3

["Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <[e-mail]>]

“Needlessly” - well, I guess in getting tired and irritated by the incessant attempts of a cheat minority to override the choice the overwhelming majority (which is what I call 75%-25% split) made. 

This group has been trying to reach consensus on “comparative riskiness” for considerable time - and failed, so far. I see no reason to expect such consensus miraculously appearing out of <where?>. Do you? If so, please enlighten me. 

One reason hybrids add risks is the practical implementation/deployment/processes/management/maintenance part, as opposed to treating the issue as a pure mathematical formula - which deployed software apparently is not (some might argue that it should be, I let the reality speak for itself). 

Since It looks like 3/4 of the audience holds position similar to mine - frankly, I don’t see why 3/4 must convince 1/4 that their position is valid (usually, it’s the other way around). 
—
Regards,
Uri

Secure Resilient Systems and Technologies
MIT Lincoln Laboratory

> On Apr 17, 2025, at 13:35, Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On 17/04/2025 18:23, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:
>> Don’t try to stuff your perception of risks and correctness into
>> everybody else’s throat.
> 
> Aside from the needlessly accusatory phrasing above, seeking to
> reach consensus on the comparative riskiness of these seems like
> a good plan to me, and entirely doable, so I disagree with you.
> 
> I also note that you earlier declined to get into the gory
> detail of why you consider hybrids more risky. Arguing for
> inclusion of text reflecting the details (gory or otherwise)
> that have been aired in public seems entirely reasonable to
> me, so if people who prefer one position over another aren't
> willing to say why, they should IMO expect their positions
> to be less well reflected in draft/RFC text.
> 
> Cheers,
> S.
> 
> <OpenPGP_signature.asc>