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Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - some issues related to PKCS11

Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com> Tue, 17 September 2013 12:57 UTC

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Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 14:57:00 +0200
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From: Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com>
To: mrex@sap.com
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS and hardware security modules - some issues related to PKCS11
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Why don't you realize a TLS stack in a secure element ?. For both full and
resume mode , in order to protect the master secret

see
http://www.ethertrust.com/wp-content/themes/ethertrust/about_ethertrust.pdf

Pascal


2013/9/17 Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>

> I fail to understand what you're trying to protect.
>
> The master secret of a session is never a secret that is hidding
> within the hardware module, instead, it is something known to the
> calling TLS protocol stack and part of the TLS session cache.
>
> For vanilla RSA cipher suites, it is deterministically derived
> from randomness generated by the client and conveyed under
> RSA encryption, deterministically combined with data known
> in plain to the TLS protocol stack.
>
> -Martin
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> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
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