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Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Tue, 27 February 2018 23:36 UTC

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Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 17:36:12 -0600
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
Cc: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@dukhovni.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:24:31AM -0500, Shumon Huque wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:59 AM, Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Several of us were well aware of this during the early days of the
> > draft, but perhaps many folks did not fully appreciate the impacts
> > until I elaborated on them last year, and added text that described
> > the "adversary with fraudulently obtained PKIX credentials" attack.
> 
> Following up to my own message, sorry ..
> 
> It occurred to me that perhaps a good way to mitigate this risk is
> a combo of mechanisms like CAA and Certificate Transparency logs.

NO.  That's insanely complicated.  A pin-for-X-minutes TTL is trivial.
Let's do this pin-to-DANE thing.

Nico
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