[TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem-01.txt

[Nathanael Ritz <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

Comments below with [NR]

On Fri, May 29, 2026 at 4:38 AM Muhammad Usama Sardar <
[e-mail]> wrote:
>  Dear Joe and Sean,
> I believe I have collected sufficient attestations from the WG that a new
proof is required for draft-ietf-tls-mlkem.
> As I understand, apart from me, there are at least 2 other WG
participants (Nadim [0] and Nathanael [1]) who are already doing or have
volunteered to do independent formal analysis in ProVerif. I take that as a
strong attestation that there is enough WG energy to do the work.

[NR] I stated clearly that “I am interested in collaborating on new
ProVerif models that explore PQ crypto as well.” I did not share any
opinion on whether a proof was required for anything.

Based on the results of the idealized KEM model variant (that I remain open
to collaborate further on), I found nothing from the verification output
that gives me any reason for concern compared to the DH model evaluating
the same properties. Of course, critical feedback on my model construction
and evaluated properties is welcome off List.

Since there appears to be an opening for some misunderstanding, please do
not misconstrue my contribution as an implied mandate or imposition against
the trajectory and current work of the TLSWG by me.

Sincerely,

Nathanael

On Fri, 29 May 2026 at 04:38, Muhammad Usama Sardar <
[e-mail]> wrote:

> Dear Joe and Sean,
>
> I believe I have collected sufficient attestations from the WG that a new
> proof is required for draft-ietf-tls-mlkem.
>
> As I understand, apart from me, there are at least 2 other WG participants
> (Nadim [0] and Nathanael [1]) who are *already* doing or have
> *volunteered* to do independent formal analysis in ProVerif. I take that
> as a strong attestation that there is enough WG energy to do the work.
>
> So with these attestations, I would like to request the initiation of the
> FATT process for draft-ietf-tls-mlkem. I believe it would be good to have
> FATT's evaluation of the artifacts that would be eventually developed by
> these efforts. Thank you for your kind consideration.
>
> In addition, I believe all concerns have been addressed in this version.
> Summary of major changes is:
>
>    - Added justification based on the FATT process: Section 4
>    - Reorganization, specially in motivation (Section 1.1)
>    - Added some common arguments: Section 6
>    - Comparison with hybrid ML-KEM in Section 4.1
>    - Clarification of what "breaking" means in Section 3
>
> For those who haven't had a chance to check the draft yet, more feedback
> on Sec. 3 and 4 is very welcome. For discussion of details of modeling,
> please contact me off-list.
>
> Best regards,
>
> -Usama
>
> [0] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/pZe6luYQeT4GhbOc1FE1xi-Lmzc/
>
> [1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/S5QioGFa3T3AFWIAjsNg8BFy5Co/
>
>
>
> -------- Forwarded Message --------
> Subject: New Version Notification for
> draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem-01.txt
> Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 03:02:54 -0700
> From: [e-mail]
> To: Muhammad Sardar <[e-mail]>
> <[e-mail]>, Muhammad Usama Sardar
> <[e-mail]>
> <[e-mail]>
>
> A new version of Internet-Draft draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem-01.txt has
> been
> successfully submitted by Muhammad Usama Sardar and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name: draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem
> Revision: 01
> Title: Potential Risks of Standalone ML-KEM in TLS 1.3
> Date: 2026-05-29
> Group: Individual Submission
> Pages: 16
> URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem-01.txt
> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem/
> HTML:
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem-01.html
> HTMLized:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem
> Diff:
> https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-usama-tls-risks-of-mlkem-01
>
> Abstract:
>
> We attest that standalone ML-KEM in TLS 1.3 breaks the existing
> formal proofs of TLS in state-of-the-art symbolic security analysis
> tool, ProVerif. In this draft, we show *exactly* where the ProVerif
> proofs break, namely transition from symmetric DHKE to asymmetric
> KEM. More specifically, the existing proofs of TLS in ProVerif are
> based on commutativity property, whereas commutativity does not apply
> to standalone ML-KEM in TLS.
>
> We also attest that from a formal analysis perspective, this is a
> much bigger change than RFC8773bis, which indeed went for FATT review
> (cf. [TLS-FATT]). We, therefore, formally request the chairs to
> initiate the FATT review of standalone ML-KEM in TLS. A few WG
> participants have already volunteered to do formal analysis in
> ProVerif.
>
> This draft also offers some preliminary discussion to help the
> developers and policy makers make informed choices. Finally, the
> draft also aims to reduce the endless repitition of arguments from
> both sides presented on several lists by documenting these arguments
> so they can simply be referred to.
>
>
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
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