Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management

Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> Sat, 01 December 2018 16:12 UTC

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From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2018 19:11:54 +0300
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ETSI releases standards for enterprise security and data centre management
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On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 6:59 PM Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>; wrote:

> This does not seem to address a problem which was brought up when the
> similar draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-00 was discussed, namely any
> system in possession of one of the non-ephemeral-ECDHE private keys,
> ostensibly for the purposes of passive traffic decryption, can arbitrarily
> resume decrypted sessions and therefore impersonate any observed clients.
>
> I'm not a fan of systems like this, but I believe for security reasons
> they should be designed in such a way that only the confidentiality of
> traffic is impacted, and a "visibility" system isn't able to leverage the
> decrypted traffic to resume decrypted sessions and thereby impersonate
> clients.
>

I do not understand why the ETSI solution does not provide ability to
impersonate clients/servers.

-- 
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky