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Re: [TLS] DSA should die

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 02 April 2015 16:45 UTC

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Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2015 11:45:35 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: CodesInChaos <codesinchaos@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA should die
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On Thu, Apr 2, 2015 at 2:39 AM, CodesInChaos <codesinchaos@gmail.com> wrote:
> Nico Williams nico@cryptonector.com wrote:
>> Yes, we could patch in a-la-carte ciphersuite negotiation by having
>> non-functional ciphersuites that wild-card all but the one kind of
>> thing.  You offer those.  A matching functional ciphersuite gets
>> selected.  Done.
>>
>> TLS_*_*_WITH_AES_GCM_*
>> TLS_*_*_WITH_*_*_SHA384
>> TLS_ECDHE_*_WITH_*_*_*
>> ...
>
> I think full a-la-carte is too complex. But I'm for negotiating the
> handshake and symmetric crypto separately. They're already very
> loosely coupled and most proposals that introduce/obsolete
> ciphersuites are only interested in one of the two sides, with the
> other being only an afterthought.

That would be a huge improvement over what we have now.

Nico
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