Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3

[Achim Kraus <[e-mail]>]

Hi Pascal,

that using these ISO 7816 card is fast and save, doesn't say too much
about the use-case without that card, or? For sure, there are
micro-controller, which are also equipped with hw-ecc or hw-rsa. And
there are more secure-devices protecting credentials. But there are also
still ones without.
I'm not sure, if I want spend too much money in my local network "light
bulb". Isn't it always a question of what to protect in which environment?

best regards
Achim

Am 21.09.20 um 14:53 schrieb Pascal Urien:
> tls-se memory footprint is
> flash 《 40KB
> ram   《 1KB
>
> time to open a tls session 1.4 seconds
>
>
> Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 14:47, Pascal Urien <[e-mail]
> <mailto:[e-mail]>> a écrit :
>
>     hi Hannes
>
>     no openssl or wolfssl are used as client in order to check
>     interoperability with tls-se server
>
>     tls-se is of course a specific implémentation for tls13 server in
>     javacard..it is written in java but an ôter implémentation is
>     written in c for constraint notes. as written in the draft tls-se
>     implementation has three software blocks: crypto lib, tls state
>     machine, and tls lib
>
>
>
>     Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 14:36, Hannes Tschofenig
>     <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> a écrit :
>
>         Hi Pascal, ____
>
>         __ __
>
>         are you saying that the stack on the secure element uses WolfSSL
>         or OpenSSL? I am sure that WolfSSL works well but for code size
>         reasons I doubt OpenSSL is possible. Can you confirm? ____
>
>         __ __
>
>         In case of WolfSSL, you have multiple options for credentials,
>         including plain PSK, PSK-ECDHE, raw public keys, and
>         certificates as I noted in my mail to the UTA list: ____
>
>         https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/uta/RJ4wU77D6f7qslfwrc16jkrPTew/____
>
>         __ __
>
>         Ciao____
>
>         Hannes____
>
>         __ __
>
>         *From:* Pascal Urien <[e-mail]
>         <mailto:[e-mail]>>
>         *Sent:* Monday, September 21, 2020 2:01 PM
>         *To:* Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]
>         <mailto:[e-mail]>>
>         *Cc:* Filippo Valsorda <[e-mail]
>         <mailto:[e-mail]>>; [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>         *Subject:* Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3____
>
>         __ __
>
>         Hi Hannes____
>
>         __ __
>
>         Yes it has been tested with several  3.04 Javacards
>         commercially available____
>
>         __ __
>
>         In the draft https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-00
>           Section 5-ISO 7816 Use Case, the exchanges are done with the
>         existing implementation____
>
>         __ __
>
>         TLS-SE TLS1.3 PSK+ECDH server works with ESP8266 or
>         Arduino+Ethernet boards ____
>
>         __ __
>
>         For client software we use OPENSSL or WolfSSL____
>
>         __ __
>
>         Pascal____
>
>         __ __
>
>         __ __
>
>         __ __
>
>         __ __
>
>         Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 12:35, Hannes Tschofenig
>         <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> a
>         écrit :____
>
>             Hi Pascal,
>
>             Thanks for the pointer to the draft.
>
>             Since I am surveying implementations for the update of RFC
>             7925 (see
>             https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile/)
>             I was wondering whether there is an implementation of this
>             approach.
>
>             Ciao
>             Hannes
>
>
>             From: Pascal Urien <[e-mail]
>             <mailto:[e-mail]>>
>             Sent: Monday, September 21, 2020 11:44 AM
>             To: Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]
>             <mailto:[e-mail]>>
>             Cc: Filippo Valsorda <[e-mail]
>             <mailto:[e-mail]>>; [e-mail]
>             <mailto:[e-mail]>
>             Subject: Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
>
>             Hi All
>
>             Here is an example of PSK+ECDHE for IoT
>
>             https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-00  uses
>             TLS1.3 server  PSK+ECDHE for secure elements
>
>             The security level in these devices is as high as EAL5+
>
>             The computing time is about 1.4s for a PSK+ECDHE session
>             (AES-128-CCM, + secp256r1)
>
>             The real critical resource is the required RAM size, less
>             than 1KB in our experiments
>
>             The secure element  only needs a classical TCP/IP interface
>             (i.e. sockets like)
>
>             Trusted PSK should avoid selfie attacks
>
>             Pascal
>
>
>
>             Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 11:29, Hannes Tschofenig
>             <mailto:[e-mail]
>             <mailto:[e-mail]>> a écrit :
>             Hi Filippo,
>
>             • Indeed, if the SCADA industry has a particular need, they
>             should profile TLS for use in that industry, and not require
>             we change the recommendation for the open Internet.
>
>             We have an IoT profile for TLS and it talks about the use of
>             PSK, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7925
>
>             On the “open Internet” (probably referring to the Web usage)
>             you are not going to use PSKs in TLS. There is a separate
>             RFC that provides recommendations for that environmnent, see
>             RFC 752. That RFC is currently being revised, see
>             https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis/
>
>             Ciao
>             Hannes
>
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