Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org> Thu, 05 June 2014 16:42 UTC
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Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 16:42:42 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation
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On Thu, Jun 05, 2014 at 08:25:26AM -0700, Watson Ladd wrote: > > I think it adds weight to my concern about using ChangeCipherSpec to do > > key reset. I still prefer the trade-offs of having a ?slow the TLS but > > keep the TCP layer open? and starting over. Much simpler to prove it?s > > correct. > > What can change when that happens? Furthermore, rekeying is a matter of > getting more PRF output: how does that introduce security concerns. Whether or not rekeying is easier to implement with a STOPTLS, or by switching directly from one keyset to another, without an intermediate transition to cleartext, a STOPTLS feature has additional upside. I don't recall whether this idea got dropped, or whether STOPTLS might yet happen in TLS 1.3. Anyone care to bring me up to speed? -- Viktor.
- [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Paul Lambert
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] CCS and key reset and renegotiation Michael StJohns