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Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor

Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> Tue, 01 April 2014 14:15 UTC

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Date: Tue, 01 Apr 2014 16:14:52 +0200
Message-ID: <CADMpkc+1Ds+PqLvhfaoXKC8FV_FfMtmOVB0wnZQU3ifYPDaqAg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
To: Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Extended random is NSA backdoor
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Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org>:

I can't speak to anyone's intentions, but note that these aren't the only
> I-Ds that add more randomness. As described in our paper, <
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-tls-additional-random-ext-01> is
> quite similar.
>
> The idea of adding more random bits seems to have been fairly popular in
> the 2006-2010 timeframe.
>
> There may be more proposals to do this, for example using <
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6358>, that I missed.
>

I think that's essentially one family of Internet-Drafts, finally resulting
in the RFC 6358 framework.  A missing link is
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-solinas-tls-additional-prf-input-01.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00 -
Rescorla/Salter, 2006
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random-02 -
Rescorla/Salter, 2009
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-solinas-tls-additional-prf-input-01 -
Solinas/Hoffman, 2009
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-tls-additional-random-ext-01 with
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6358 - Hoffman, 2010/2012

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