[TLS] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-12.txt

tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> Tue, 07 April 2026 06:37 UTC

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From: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 07 Apr 2026 12:06:31 +0530
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Subject: [TLS] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-12.txt
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The revised draft https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-extended-
key-update/ addresses the comments discussed during the WG meeting at
IETF-125 and the pending issues in Github.

-Tiru

On Mon, 6 Apr 2026 at 12:30, <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:

> Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-12.txt is now available.
> It
> is a work item of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) WG of the IETF.
>
>    Title:   Extended Key Update for Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3
>    Authors: Hannes Tschofenig
>             Michael Tüxen
>             Tirumaleswar Reddy
>             Steffen Fries
>             Yaroslav Rosomakho
>    Name:    draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-12.txt
>    Pages:   42
>    Dates:   2026-04-05
>
> Abstract:
>
>    TLS 1.3 ensures forward secrecy by performing an ephemeral Diffie-
>    Hellman key exchange during the initial handshake, protecting past
>    communications even if a party's long-term keys (typically a private
>    key with a corresponding certificate) are later compromised.  While
>    the built-in KeyUpdate mechanism allows application traffic keys to
>    be refreshed during a session, it does not incorporate fresh entropy
>    from a new key exchange and therefore does not provide post-
>    compromise security.  This limitation can pose a security risk in
>    long-lived sessions, such as those found in industrial IoT or
>    telecommunications environments.
>
>    To address this, this specification defines an extended key update
>    mechanism that performs a fresh Diffie-Hellman exchange within an
>    active session, thereby ensuring post-compromise security.  By
>    forcing attackers to exfiltrate new key material repeatedly, this
>    approach mitigates the risks associated with static key compromise.
>    Regular renewal of session keys helps contain the impact of such
>    compromises.  The extension is applicable to both TLS 1.3 and DTLS
>    1.3.
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update/
>
> There is also an HTML version available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-12.html
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>
> https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-12
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at:
> rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts
>
>
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