Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com> Mon, 23 October 2017 16:25 UTC

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From: Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2017 12:25:32 -0400
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Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
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> On Oct 22, 2017, at 2:40 PM, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>; wrote:
> 
> On Oct 22, 2017, at 1:54 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>> wrote:
>> No one is requiring TLS 1.3 that I know about.  However, there are places that require visibility into TLS.  I will let one of the people that works in a regulated industry offer pointers to the documents.
> 
> What they require is visibility into contents of the flow that they are using encryption to protect.   Right now, the protocol they are using is TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2.   The right thing for them to do if they continue to need this visibility and are no longer permitted to use TLS 1.2 is to use IPsec+IKE,

Is there running code that demonstrates the IPsec+IKE can be deployed and operated at scale in the sort of environment the enterprise network tips have described to us?

> or some protocol that is designed for this use case, not to take a protocol designed specifically for securing flows from on-path eavesdropping and create a mode where it is easier to wiretap.

...assuming the necessary lead time and support from vendors to implement another protocol.

> There is no reason other than momentum for them to switch to TLS 1.3 when it doesn't address their use case.

But TLS 1.3 addresses *part* of the use case, as it does provide better security and it represents an incremental change to the current deployment and operation practices.  

- Ralph

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