[TLS] Updating for non-X.509 certificate types

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Fri, 10 March 2017 02:29 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 16:43:19 -0800
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Subject: [TLS] Updating for non-X.509 certificate types
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As noted in https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/722, the new fancy
TLS 1.3 Certificate structure doesn't map well to the various non-X.509
cert structures we have defined, specifically:

- Raw Public Keys
- Cached Info
- OpenPGP

Probably mapping each of these to 1.3 is relatively straightforward
(Raw public keys == a list with one key, Cached info == the hash of
each cert + its extensions, and so on), but I tend to think that given the
modest/specialized deployment of these extensions, it's better to do a
set of small bis RFCs to define each of these, rather than add a bunch
of clutter to TLS 1.3 proper.

Does anyone object to this? Volunteers.

-Ekr