[TLS] Re: ML-KEM IANA and draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement codepoint and inconsistencies

Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Fri, 07 March 2025 10:22 UTC

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From: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2025 20:22:04 +1000
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Subject: [TLS] Re: ML-KEM IANA and draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement codepoint and inconsistencies
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On Fri, Mar 7, 2025 at 7:01 PM Kris Kwiatkowski <kris@amongbytes.com> wrote:

> May I know if you have a plan for FIPS certificaton for PQC after release?
>

Absolutely - OpenSSL-3.5 will be heading into a fresh FIPS140-3 validation
in April once the release is final - and that will include the PQC
algorithms that have been added.
Our testing for ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA uses ACVP published test data as
the basis along with some interesting scripts to get the test data into a
format our test suites support.

There is also a multi-vendor KMIP PQC interop running this week that has
vendors using OpenSSL-3.5 and Bouncy Castle Java 1.81 (beta) and that is
exercising the same ACVP tests via KMIP between KMIP clients and KMIP
servers - but that is in the context of the day job rather than OpenSSL -
see
https://groups.oasis-open.org/discussion/kmip-tc-interop-process-2025-for-pqcpdf-uploaded
as a starting point for information on that activity. That testing also
covers X25519MLKEM768 for those vendors which have that capability enabled.
ML-DSA certificates are not within the scope of that test activity.

There is also on-going discussion between vendors about a PKCS#11 v3.2 PQC
focused interop but timing and participants for that haven't yet been
figured out.

Tim