Re: [TLS] Why there should not be a TLS 2.0

Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org> Sun, 08 June 2014 15:49 UTC

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Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2014 15:49:01 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org>
To: tls@ietf.org
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References: <CAMm+Lwiw0TO6D5qnfKFb26kg9-+mzCDHJNd9fMi+BrFf4rQaHA@mail.gmail.com> <20140608122758.GA10562@roeckx.be>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Why there should not be a TLS 2.0
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On Sun, Jun 08, 2014 at 02:27:58PM +0200, Kurt Roeckx wrote:

> I would imagine that the client would like to do a "please give me
> a tunnel to that hostname", and then get back some descriptor that
> it can use to talk to it.  Please note that I say hostname,
> because I think that you can have several names each which it's
> own certificate on the same IP address.

Yes, but stronger yet, one needs (ala GSSAPI + Kerberos, which for
all its limitations gets some things right) to be able to ask for
service@hostname, not just hostname.  The underlying Kerberos
stack works with service/instance@REALM, which also makes sense.

We could define new DANE record formats for scalable public-key
cross realm authentication with Kerberos or a Kerberos-like system,
and DNSSEC for a suitably secure hostname->realm mapping.

-- 
	Viktor.