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[TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC2246 (3481)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Fri, 08 February 2013 22:01 UTC

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Subject: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC2246 (3481)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC2246,
"The TLS Protocol Version 1.0".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=2246&eid=3481

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>

Section: 8.1.2

Original Text
-------------
8.1.2. Diffie-Hellman

   A conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is performed. The
   negotiated key (Z) is used as the pre_master_secret, and is converted
   into the master_secret, as specified above.


Corrected Text
--------------
8.1.2. Diffie-Hellman

   A conventional Diffie-Hellman computation is performed.  The
   negotiated key (Z) is used as the pre_master_secret, and is converted
   into the master_secret, as specified above.  Leading bytes of Z that
   contain all zero bits are stripped before it is used as the
   pre_master_secret.


Notes
-----
Adopting the clarification from rfc4346 Section 8.1.2.  Not stripping the leading zero bits of Z will cause interop problems (handshake failures) with the installed base.  Rfc2246 is still the authoritative spec for TLSv1.0.  One can not implement TLSv1.0 from rfc4346.

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-------------
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--------------------------------------
RFC2246 (no draft string recorded)
--------------------------------------
Title               : The TLS Protocol Version 1.0
Publication Date    : January 1999
Author(s)           : T. Dierks, C. Allen
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Transport Layer Security
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

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