Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension

[Nico Williams <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 05:33:27PM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Wed, 4 Apr 2018, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> >A) Recommendation of adding denial of existence proofs in the chain provided by the extension
> >B) Adding signaling to require the use of this extension for a period of time (Pinning with TTL)
> >C) Both
> 
> These options need a bit of clarification.
> 
> If you do A) then by publishing the proof of non-existance records, you
> can cancel any outstanding kind of pin done. And you would not need B)

Hmm, not quite.  You might want to publish the "clear the pin" (TTL ==
zero) without having to first stop publishing TLSA RRs.

The idea is to first ramp up the TTL, and if there's any problems /
change of mind, ramp it down and remove the TLSA RRs when the last
possible extant pin must have expired.

Therefore I think (B) is more urgent.  (A) is even more trivial than
(B), so there's no reason not to do both ((C)).

> [..]
> 
> So to support all cases, I would say C) but I think B) would get us
> pretty far on a lot of deployments.

+1

> The document's intension is clearly to staple DNSSEC answers for the
> TLSA query on the TLS handshake. Omiting proof of non-existence means
> it fails to achieve its specified goal and makes this TLS extension
> completely useless[*]

+1

Thanks,

Nico
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