Re: [TLS] Update spec to match current practices for certificate chain order

"Ryan Sleevi" <> Fri, 08 May 2015 21:53 UTC

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Date: Fri, 8 May 2015 14:53:34 -0700
From: "Ryan Sleevi" <>
To: "Dave Garrett" <>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Update spec to match current practices for certificate chain order
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On Fri, May 8, 2015 2:34 pm, Dave Garrett wrote:
>  This is a two decade old set of security standards. If you want any strict
>  separation of layers, you're going to need to start from scratch. (which
>  we're
>  hopefully doing soon with something QUIC based) Anything other than
>  acknowledging this current situation as a mess and doing what you can
>  where you can (e.g. HPKP) is not really practical.
>  Wise as it may be to try to keep things decoupled, it's not the current
>  reality.

I think you've misunderstood me. Hopefully a re-read of the original
message will provide clarity.

The "problem" caused is precisely *because* the layers are decoupled. To
satisfy Martin's requirement (e.g. at a browser), you would necessarily
*need* to couple the layers. And while it's true that browser's internal
implementations have begun to blur the layers such that a tight coupling
may not be entirely unreasonable, they are *not* coupled to the degree
necessary to satisfy the second MUST, which is why we're in the present

So by accepting the status quo and having the spec updated to reflect
that, we agree that the decoupling/loose coupling is good.

By changing clients to enforce the second MUST, we promote more coupling
at the clients. That's not good in my view.