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From: Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2020 09:45:39 -0700
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To: =?UTF-8?Q?Sof=C3=ADa_Celi?= <cherenkov@riseup.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] comments on draft-subcerts
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Thank you for the review, Sof=C3=ADa. I'm looking forward to the PR. Once t=
hat
lands we'll submit a version of the doc with WGLC#2 comments incorporated.

Nick

On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 12:35 AM Sof=C3=ADa Celi <cherenkov@riseup.net> wro=
te:

> Dear, list,
>
> Sorry for sending this past the last call.
>
> Few comments on the draft, which are:
>
> - On Section 1:
>
> "For clarity, we will refer to the certificate issued by the CA as a
> "certificate", or "delegation certificate", and the one issued by the
> operator as a "delegated credential" or "DC"."
>
> I think this sentence can be their own paragraph, so it does not get
> lost with the rest of the text. It will be good to clarify as well the
> usage of 'credential', 'delegation', 'delegator' terms used through out
> the document. It will be really nice to clarify the term 'credential' as
> it sometimes seems to be used to refer to 'delegated credential', and
> sometimes to the 'Credential' struct.
>
> - On section 7.3
>
> "Delegated credentials do not provide any additional form of early
> revocation. Since it is short lived, the expiry of the delegated
> credential would revoke the credential. Revocation of the long term
> private key that signs the delegated credential also implicitly
> revokes the delegated credential."
>
> Not sure how the implicit revocation will work. It is my understanding
> that the sole way to check that a DC is revoked is by verifying its
> valid time, and this is the way that renders it 'invalid'.
> Maybe, the DC is valid until it expires regardless if the long-term
> private key is revoked, as I don't see a way to mark the DC invalid when
> the long-term private key revokes. But perhaps, I'm understanding this
> incorrectly.
>
> In that case, how the DC signed by a revoked key will be treated? Should
> it wait until they expire to render them completely explicitly invalid?
>
>
> I have other minor editorial changes that I'll send as a PR.
>
> Thanks!
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Sof=C3=ADa Celi
> @claucece
> http://claucece.github.io/
> Cryptographic research and implementation at many places, but mainly at
> Cloudflare
> FAB9 3EDC 7CDD 1198 DCFD  4558 91BB 6B45 6F44 2D02
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thank you for the review, Sof=C3=ADa. I&#39;m looking forw=
ard to the PR. Once that lands we&#39;ll submit a version of the doc with W=
GLC#2 comments incorporated.<div><br></div><div>Nick</div></div><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 13, 2=
020 at 12:35 AM Sof=C3=ADa Celi &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:cherenkov@riseup.net"=
>cherenkov@riseup.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex">Dear, list,<br>
<br>
Sorry for sending this past the last call.<br>
<br>
Few comments on the draft, which are:<br>
<br>
- On Section 1:<br>
<br>
&quot;For clarity, we will refer to the certificate issued by the CA as a<b=
r>
&quot;certificate&quot;, or &quot;delegation certificate&quot;, and the one=
 issued by the<br>
operator as a &quot;delegated credential&quot; or &quot;DC&quot;.&quot;<br>
<br>
I think this sentence can be their own paragraph, so it does not get<br>
lost with the rest of the text. It will be good to clarify as well the<br>
usage of &#39;credential&#39;, &#39;delegation&#39;, &#39;delegator&#39; te=
rms used through out<br>
the document. It will be really nice to clarify the term &#39;credential&#3=
9; as<br>
it sometimes seems to be used to refer to &#39;delegated credential&#39;, a=
nd<br>
sometimes to the &#39;Credential&#39; struct.<br>
<br>
- On section 7.3<br>
<br>
&quot;Delegated credentials do not provide any additional form of early<br>
revocation. Since it is short lived, the expiry of the delegated<br>
credential would revoke the credential. Revocation of the long term<br>
private key that signs the delegated credential also implicitly<br>
revokes the delegated credential.&quot;<br>
<br>
Not sure how the implicit revocation will work. It is my understanding<br>
that the sole way to check that a DC is revoked is by verifying its<br>
valid time, and this is the way that renders it &#39;invalid&#39;.<br>
Maybe, the DC is valid until it expires regardless if the long-term<br>
private key is revoked, as I don&#39;t see a way to mark the DC invalid whe=
n<br>
the long-term private key revokes. But perhaps, I&#39;m understanding this<=
br>
incorrectly.<br>
<br>
In that case, how the DC signed by a revoked key will be treated? Should<br=
>
it wait until they expire to render them completely explicitly invalid?<br>
<br>
<br>
I have other minor editorial changes that I&#39;ll send as a PR.<br>
<br>
Thanks!<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Sof=C3=ADa Celi<br>
@claucece<br>
<a href=3D"http://claucece.github.io/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank"=
>http://claucece.github.io/</a><br>
Cryptographic research and implementation at many places, but mainly at<br>
Cloudflare<br>
FAB9=C2=A03EDC=C2=A07CDD=C2=A01198=C2=A0DCFD=C2=A0=C2=A04558=C2=A091BB=C2=
=A06B45=C2=A06F44=C2=A02D02<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
TLS mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:TLS@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">TLS@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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