Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers

Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org> Mon, 19 March 2018 10:53 UTC

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From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org>
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 06:53:13 -0400
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To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Cc: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers
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+1

On Mon, Mar 19, 2018 at 3:32 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
<dkg@fifthhorseman.net>; wrote:
> On Thu 2018-03-15 20:10:46 +0200, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>> On 15 Mar 2018, at 10:53, Ion Larranaga Azcue <ilarra@s21sec.com>; wrote:
>>>
>>> I fail to see how the current draft can be used to provide visibility
>>> to an IPS system in order to detect bots that are inside the bank…
>>>
>>> On the one hand, the bot would never opt-in for visibility if it’s
>>> trying to exfiltrate data…
>>
>> The presumption is that any legitimate application would opt-in, so
>> the IPS blocks any TLS connection that does not opt in.
>
> Thanks for clarifying the bigger picture here, Yoav.
>
> So if this technology were deployed on a network where not all parties
> are mutually trusting, it would offer network users a choice between
> surveillance by the network on the one hand (opt-in) and censorship on
> the other (opt-out and be blocked).  Is that right?
>
> Designing mechanism for the Internet that allows/facilitates/encourages
> the network operator to force this choice on the user seems problematic.
> Why do we want this for a protocol like TLS that is intended to be used
> across potentially adversarial networks?
>
> datacenter operators who want access to the cleartext passing through
> machines they already control already have mechanisms at their disposal
> to do this (whether they can do so at scale safely without exposing
> their customers' data to further risks is maybe an open question,
> regardless of mechanism).
>
> Mechanisms that increase "visibility" of the cleartext run counter to
> the goals of TLS as an end-to-end two-party secure communications
> protocol.
>
> Regards,
>
>      --dkg
>
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>



-- 
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
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