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Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI

"Sniffen, Brian" <bsniffen@akamai.com> Thu, 17 April 2014 13:17 UTC

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From: "Sniffen, Brian" <bsniffen@akamai.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2014 09:16:53 -0400
Thread-Topic: [TLS] About encrypting SNI
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Subject: Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI
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On Apr 16, 2014, at 10:08 PM, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> 
> You still only need four.  Remember that my ClientHello key is
> completely independent of the key associated with the server
> certificate, and that it can be stripped.

Do I understand that you intend one for normal operation, one more during rotations---and then for my example that different people want different crypto, another operation/rotation pair?

I can imagine that working well in 2015.  I think in 2020 we'll surely find it too tight and chafing. Maybe that is enough.

-Brian

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