Re: [TLS] W3C Content Transformation Proxies guidelines and security

Francois Daoust wrote:

> HTTPS communications obviously cannot be intercepted by a Content
> Transformation proxy. However, such a proxy can re-write HTTPS links
> that appear in an HTTP response so that the user goes through it when it
> clicks on the link.

Since this is a man-in-the-middle attack, it would be interesting to
know how browsers react in that case. It should be have been made clear
to the user which site he connected to (www.proxy.com instead of
www.amazon.com).

Anyway, about (b). the server cannot detect the attack (unless of course
he requests client certificates) via the TLS protocol, the client could.
The server could detect the attack by noticing few IPs that make many
different transactions.

But actually what you are trying to achieve changes all that is known to
people for "secure" web pages. Now with your scheme you don't trust the
merchant, but the network provider[0]. So for your point (1), I would
say that it is not just a "security" issue, it is a total change of the
protocol currently used for secure web browsing.

[0]. And it is much more than that. Once users get used to have some
proxy between them and the merchant's site, it would be much easier to
attack the TLS protocol that way. That is because noone will verify the
identity of the site they connected to.

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