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Re: [TLS] Call for Consensus on removal of renegotiation

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Wed, 25 June 2014 20:47 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 23:47:50 +0300
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To: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Call for Consensus on removal of renegotiation
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On Jun 25, 2014, at 11:42 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

>> Nothing. But that would require changing those applications.
> 
> Wouldn't they already have to change in order to use TLS 1.3?  Or would the underlying library switch to it, and then not do the magic rekey calls?

An application running on something like Apache can replace the OpenSSL library, and instantly get upgraded from supporting only SSLv3 and TLS 1.0 to support TLS 1.2 and AES-GCM and ECDHE.

If that application ever ran enough traffic that renegotiation for rekeying was needed, upgrading to the next OpenSSL that includes TLS 1.3 would not be as smooth.

BTW: This discussion is totally missing the other use of renegotiation - to move from server-authenticated to mutually-authenticated. Unless that need is addressed (by some mechanism), I can’t support removing renegotiation.

Yoav

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