Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Sun, 13 March 2016 14:55 UTC

Return-Path: <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0878312D64C for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Mar 2016 07:55:02 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.302
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cs.tcd.ie
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id bwo90OzJ0cOe for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 13 Mar 2016 07:55:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EABAB12D561 for <tls@ietf.org>; Sun, 13 Mar 2016 07:54:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id B9F37BE33; Sun, 13 Mar 2016 14:54:58 +0000 (GMT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie
Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id nMunibEOv2cO; Sun, 13 Mar 2016 14:54:57 +0000 (GMT)
Received: from [10.87.49.100] (unknown [86.46.23.221]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BE27EBE2F; Sun, 13 Mar 2016 14:54:56 +0000 (GMT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1457880897; bh=5l21OEcu6/MN4IRYpiOhrLMY5nkmgeNtx+k/QfEWPdw=; h=Subject:To:References:Cc:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=svzJGbkhDSW+tT06qYmG+RJS+Mv8bIdMm0AM7A8gaT0UMqgDgaUfZ8zPNa3d2k72T vD8X7M369yXPm2+wdqpniF/fweadjXM88m7PGtPcP93qxOXinOOaTu4+fedGLKlP/5 pE0+9J5W88LJWqXCAbTtBS90Kfg/dXhlHJv3BHO8=
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
References: <56E54B85.4050204@cs.tcd.ie> <CABcZeBNTEB4FxSN=rCZBE02UMn1kDRh83Qob5K2Yf9JTdCQP9A@mail.gmail.com> <56E5706C.4020804@cs.tcd.ie> <CABcZeBMmWG-+eN8W_0TqgtM53x8ZhK-=5TfqFpbJDx9dZGGUmw@mail.gmail.com> <56E57C0B.50802@cs.tcd.ie> <CABcZeBM_gihJtMUjtCBmMezo5pOJqeec_jir872F6fwW0iU3gQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url=
Message-ID: <56E57F3F.5040405@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2016 14:54:55 +0000
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <CABcZeBM_gihJtMUjtCBmMezo5pOJqeec_jir872F6fwW0iU3gQ@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha-256; boundary="------------ms000202000600060806070906"
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/aHxxdZs0_4qchH_D3R1G2OI4T-U>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2016 14:55:03 -0000


On 13/03/16 14:49, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>  Perhaps we could start by actually sponsoring some of those
> reviews. Given that HTTP is the primary customer for 0-RTT, perhaps
> Mark or Martin would be willing to start a review there?

I think that'd really help esp. if we can get folks looking at a
range of protocols that use TLS.

For the web, I'm pretty confident that the analysis will be done
and done well - that is the main use-case motivating this after
all. But getting that started now would still be great.

Getting a few non-web cases analysed would be great too if we
can figure a way to help get that to happen.

Cheers,
S.