[TLS] Proliferation of TLS cipher suites

Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com> Thu, 24 June 2010 18:08 UTC

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Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2010 14:08:55 -0400
From: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Proliferation of TLS cipher suites
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The TLS WG has had requests to adopt TLS cipher suites I-Ds.  If the 
WG declines (as it has recently), the authors then come to me.  What 
I'd like to layout is a plan for determining what route the I-Ds 
should take through the IETF standardization process.  Here's the 
steps I'm suggesting (I'd like to see if people think these are 
reasonable):

1) Submit an individual I-D documenting the TLS cipher suites
(document the cryptographic algorithm somewhere else).

2) Ask the TLS WG for adoption.  If the answer is no, then jump to #5.

3) Proceed as WG document.  WG selects and requests the track.

4) AD processes the document normally.  In general, this means
progressing on the requested track.  If the WG proposed standards
track, the AD will consider whether there is broad international
support for this algorithm. The AD may decide to request publication
as Informational if support is not broad-based.

5) Authors ask for AD sponsorship of I-D.

6) AD will ask the following question: Is there broad international
support for this algorithm.  If the answer is no, then jump to #8.

7) AD will sponsor the document for publication on standards track.

8) AD will sponsor the document on either informational or
experimental track.

I obviously think that almost all cipher suite I-Ds ought to end up
informational RFCs.  Too many standards track cipher suites leads to
implementation difficulties.  Additionally, the reviews in the WG
aren't on the cryptographic algorithm, it's just on whether the
document properly presents the cipher suites.  For non-standards track
TLS cipher suite assignment, there's an expert review that performs
this role. Regardless of the path followed, the expert reviewer still
has to do their job.  That's how the WG wanted it and we're going to
give it to them.

To summarize, we think there are two ways to get a standards track TLS
cipher suite RFC:

Rule 1 - If the I-D came from the TLS WG.

Rule 2 - If the cipher suite has broad international support.

spt