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Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 20 October 2017 10:48 UTC

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To: Darin Pettis <dpp.edco@gmail.com>, Paul Turner <PAUL.TURNER@venafi.com>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 11:48:32 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
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I agree with Christian and Ben's points. I'd also add:

On 19/10/17 23:30, Darin Pettis wrote:
> The question has been raised: "Why address visibility now?"   The answer is
> that it is critical that the visibility capability is retained.  It is
> available today through the RSA key exchange algorithm. 

That yet again ignores the fact that TLS1.2 will continue to
be available, which utterly undermines your argument that we
need to disrupt the work on TLS1.3 with this divisive debate

S

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