Re: [TLS] Summarizing identity change discussion so far

[Peter Saint-Andre <[e-mail]>]

On 12/17/09 6:15 PM, Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> I'll just state this: I believe that defining the semantics of
> identity credentials provided during the course of the TLS protocol's
> execution is NOT within the legitimate realm of the design of the TLS
> protocol.  TLS explicitly references PKIX, and PKIX is really the only
> place that uses 'identity', but (on further reading) it doesn't
> describe precisely what 'identity' is.
> 
> So, I'll take a stab at a potential guidance for those who don't have
> the time to research in-depth, taking into account Pasi's and
> everyone's ideas: If there is a match between ANY one of the new
> certificate's Subject/sAN and the old certificate's Subject/sAN,
> including all path components in the same order for that entity, AND
> is issued by the same authority, it SHOULD be regarded as being the
> same identity, though exceptions will undoubtedly exist.  Differences
> in the Certificate Policy, kU, or eKU fields SHOULD be evaluated as
> well, to ensure that the new certificate is valid for the kind of
> connection and transactions being performed.

For an attempt at in-depth guidance about the checking of identities in
certificates presented within application protocols that use TLS, see:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-02

I hope to push out -03 in the next week, incorporating feedback received
at IETF 76.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/