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Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms

Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 02 April 2015 00:46 UTC

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Date: Wed, 01 Apr 2015 17:46:40 -0700
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms
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The TLS BCP (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp-11, soon 
to be published), recommends two cipher suites based on AES-256-GCM and 
SHA-384. Doesn't it make sense to have them as SHOULD, for the sake of 
continuity and also for those people who actually desire a higher level 
of bit-strength?

Also, just wondering: is ECDSA popular enough today to be a MUST? For 
example, is the CAB Forum pushing its members to deploy such certificates?

Thanks,
	Yaron

On 04/01/2015 02:56 PM, Yoav Nir wrote:
> I support this.
>
> I think it’s kind of funny to make ChaCha20-Poly1305 a SHOULD-level
> requirement, when (a) there is no ciphersuite that uses this algorithm
> in the registry, and (b) the WG has not accepted any document that
> proposes such a ciphersuite. But it’s just funny, not bad. I’m sure we
> will adopt the document soon.
>
> Yoav
>
>> On Apr 1, 2015, at 9:12 PM, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net
>> <mailto:joe@salowey.net>> wrote:
>>
>> We did not get a chance to talk about MTI algorithms in Dallas, but
>> the chairs would like to judge consensus for the algorithms discussed
>> in the interim.  The CFRG has closed or will close soon on ChaCha20
>> and curve 25519 recommendations so they are included.  We will be
>> calling for acceptance to bring drafts on these into the working group
>> shortly.
>>
>> Keep in mind that mandatory to implement (MTI) is not mandatory to use
>> and that it is expected that there will be profiles for specific
>> environments.
>>
>> Below is the proposed algorithm list that had consensus at the Seattle
>> Interim. Please reply on the TLS mailing list indicating whether or
>> not you agree with the consensus.  If not, please indicate why.  This
>> consensus call will close on April, 23, 2015.
>>
>> o Symmetric:
>>         MUST AES-GCM 128
>>         SHOULD ChaCha20-Poly1305
>>
>> o Hash:
>>         MUST SHA-256
>>
>> o Key Agreement: ECDH
>>         MUST P-256
>>         SHOULD 25519
>>
>> o Signature:
>>         MUST ECDSA P-256
>>         MUST RSA
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> J&S
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
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