IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [TLS] A new TLS version negotiation mechanism

Yuhong Bao <yuhongbao_386@hotmail.com> Thu, 12 March 2015 23:58 UTC

Return-Path: <yuhongbao_386@hotmail.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 57B821A885D for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 12 Mar 2015 16:58:38 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.66
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.66 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Ol_iAyQs0j7w for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 12 Mar 2015 16:58:37 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from BLU004-OMC3S35.hotmail.com (blu004-omc3s35.hotmail.com [65.55.116.110]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C503A1A8850 for <tls@ietf.org>; Thu, 12 Mar 2015 16:58:36 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from BLU177-W17 ([65.55.116.72]) by BLU004-OMC3S35.hotmail.com over TLS secured channel with Microsoft SMTPSVC(7.5.7601.22751); Thu, 12 Mar 2015 16:58:35 -0700
X-TMN: [d+w+RdSYNmujj0MAKSwRJblccWI3Xvby]
X-Originating-Email: [yuhongbao_386@hotmail.com]
Message-ID: <BLU177-W17E8D59E3D693106324426C3060@phx.gbl>
From: Yuhong Bao <yuhongbao_386@hotmail.com>
To: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>, Stephen Checkoway <s@pahtak.org>
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 16:58:35 -0700
Importance: Normal
In-Reply-To: <201503120326.38588.davemgarrett@gmail.com>
References: <201503081339.47927.davemgarrett@gmail.com>, <201503111456.38308.davemgarrett@gmail.com>, <D43A19CC-4559-4446-85F2-06A9B6468E07@pahtak.org>, <201503120326.38588.davemgarrett@gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 12 Mar 2015 23:58:35.0735 (UTC) FILETIME=[73D3EE70:01D05D20]
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/b-zH9kSNInSbsuonOhK1br3SWC4>
Cc: "rdugal@certicom.com" <rdugal@certicom.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] A new TLS version negotiation mechanism
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 23:58:38 -0000

> On Thursday, March 12, 2015 01:01:27 am Stephen Checkoway wrote:
>>
>> On Mar 11, 2015, at 2:56 PM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, January 20, 2015 11:01:31 pm Xiaoyin Liu wrote:
>>>> (5) Number of sites that are tolerant to (TLS1.3, TLS1.3): 397,152 (93.1%)
>>>> (6) Number of sites that need to fallback to (TLS1.0, TLS1.3): 22,461 (5.3%)
>>>> (7) Number of sites that need to fallback to (TLS1.0, TLS1.2): 6,352 (1.5%)
>>>> (8) Number of sites that need to fallback to (TLS1.0, TLS1.0): 454 (0.1%)
>>>>
>>>> The total number of TLS enabled sites is 426,419. TLS 1.3 intolerant sites (7 and 8) are about 1.6%.
>>
>> Most of this is about the record layer version
>
> I just wanted to post the full data set here so it wasn't out of context.
>
>> The real data here is that 1.5% of servers are intolerant of 1.3 but tolerate 1.2. So that was (a) and (b) in my list but it's pretty hard to measure (c): servers that aren't maintained or can't be upgraded.
>>
>> I remain unconvinced, but others can weigh in.
>
> Let me put it to you this way: ~0.1% of servers are TLS 1.2 intolerant and browser vendors are STILL having trouble dropping insecure fallback, if they are attempting it at all.
Many of them seems to be caused by older versions of the Certicom TLS stack used in older versions of Oracle Application Server for example.
It seems that renego patched versions will tolerate TLS 1.2 if TLS 1.0 is used in the record layer:
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=windecare.wind.it
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=service.oneaccount.com
(Notice that IE/Java fails but Firefox/Chrome works)

Yuhong Bao

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email