Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8446 (5483)

Patrick Kelsey <pat.kelsey@notforadio.com> Mon, 05 August 2019 13:43 UTC

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From: Patrick Kelsey <pat.kelsey@notforadio.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 09:43:21 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8446 (5483)
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I brought this up to Ekr at IETF 105, and he said he hadn't seen this
particular errata, so here's a bump to the top of the list.

As it's now been about a year that this errata has remained in the initial
state, I think it might be worth having a look at and advancing to the next
state, if for no other reason than avoidance of the mistaken external
impression that there is longstanding uncertainty about a report that part
of the document says that a private key is to be put on the wire.

-Pat

On Mon, Aug 27, 2018 at 11:30 PM RFC Errata System <
rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>; wrote:

> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
> "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
>
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5483
>
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Technical
> Reported by: Patrick Kelsey <pat.kelsey@notforadio.com>;
>
> Section: 4.2.8.2
>
> Original Text
> -------------
> For X25519 and X448, the contents of the public value are the byte
> string inputs and outputs of the corresponding functions defined in
> [RFC7748]: 32 bytes for X25519 and 56 bytes for X448.
>
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> For X25519 and X448, the contents of the public value are the byte
> string outputs of the corresponding functions defined in [RFC7748]: 32
> bytes for X25519 and 56 bytes for X448.
>
> Notes
> -----
> Per Section 7.4.2 of this RFC and Section 6 of RFC7748, the byte string
> inputs to the corresponding ECDH scalar multiplication function are the
> private key and the u-coordinate of the standard public base point, the
> former of which of course must not be transmitted and the latter of which
> is a known constant.
>
> From another perspective, including the byte string inputs in the contents
> of the public value would contradict the resulting content sizes given at
> the end of the cited paragraph as well as the statement in Section 7.4.2
> that the public key put into the KeyShareEntry is the output of ECDH scalar
> multiplication function.
>
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
>
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version
> 1.3
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Transport Layer Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
>